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Abstract 
 
Several factors limit the energy savings potential and increase the costs of energy-
efficient technologies to consumers. These factors may usefully be placed into two 
categories; one category is what economists would define as market failures and the other 
is related to consumer preferences. This paper provides a conceptual framework for 
understanding the roles of these factors, and develops a methodology to quantify their 
effects on costs and potentials of two energy efficient end uses – residential lighting and 
clothes washers. It notes the significant roles played by the high implicit cost of obtaining 
information about the benefits of the two technologies and the apparent inability to 
process and utilize information. For compact fluorescent lamps, this report finds a 
conservative estimate of the cost of conserved energy of 3.1 cents per kWh. For clothes 
washers, including water savings reduces the cost of conserved energy from 13.6 cents to 
4.3 cents per equivalent kWh. Despite these benefits, market share remains low. About 
18 million tons of CO2 could be saved cost effectively from 2005 sales of these two 
technologies alone. The paper also notes that trading of carbon emissions will incur 
transaction costs that will range from less than 10 cents per metric ton of CO2 for larger 
size projects and programs to a few dollars per metric ton of carbon for the smaller ones. 

Executive Summary 
Two general approaches have been used for the assessment of energy demand and supply 
– the so-called “bottom-up” and “top-down” approaches. The bottom-up approach 
focuses on individual technologies for delivering energy services, such as household 
durable goods and industrial process technologies. The top-down method assumes a 
general equilibrium or macroeconomic perspective, wherein costs are defined in terms of 
changes in economic output, income, or GDP, typically from the imposition of energy or 
emissions taxes. 
The bottom-up approach assumes that various factors prevent consumers from taking 
actions that would be in their private self-interest, that is, would result in the provision of 
energy services at lower cost. These factors include lack of information about energy 
efficiency opportunities, lack of access to capital to finance energy efficiency investment, 
misplaced incentives which separate responsibilities for making capital investments and 
paying operating costs, hidden costs, transaction costs, bounded rationality, and product 
unavailability.  
The thrust of this work thus focuses on the development of a bottom-up approach that (1) 
accounts for all costs of a mitigation option, including non-energy and transaction costs, 
and (2) allows for representation of the impact of each factor on a cost component and/or 
the penetration level of a mitigation option. We focus on energy efficiency options and 
the representation of their marginal cost curves, typically referred to as cost of conserved 
energy (CCE) curves, using the costs and benefits faced by consumers.  
We illustrate the use of our factors approach by demonstrating its application to two 
residential building technologies – CFLs and clothes washers. These technologies are 
characterized by differing levels of financial investment as well as differing degrees of 
portability. Thus, each technology is affected by a slightly different set of the factors 
enumerated above. Note that the values used for various parameters (particularly for the 
implicit information and preference costs) are entirely hypothetical. The focus of this 
study is less on quantitative results and more on the application of the methodological 
approach. 
In California, the market share of CFLs for residential use was 1% or less until the 
electricity crisis in 2001 when the share jumped to about 6% for the year. Since 2001, the 
market share of CFLs has fallen to between 4% and 5% per year (Itron, 2004). Given the 
energy savings CFLs provide, their slow penetration into the residential lighting market 
would be difficult to explain. To derive an estimate of cumulative penetration we 
calculated the number of CFLs purchased in the eight years (the approximate lifespan of 
a CFL used 2.5 hours per day) prior to 2005 using data from Itron (2004). The result is 
that by 2005, a cumulative 21% of all fixtures are assumed to be using CFLs. 
Figure ES-1 shows estimated lifetime GHG savings from purchase of CFLs in 2005.The 
total length of the curve represents the possible savings if the entire eligible stock were to 
be switched to CFLs in 2005. From left to right, the points along the curve show how 
each barrier diminishes the potential savings and the impact of each barrier on the CCE. 
The first several factors are all deemed to affect the eligible stock of fixtures without 
necessarily impacting the expected costs and benefits. For example, an assumed 1% of 
households have their electric service included in their rent (i.e. are not separately 
metered) reduces the number of households due to split incentives. Other costless factors 
include “lock-in,” meaning that CFLs could not fit into some fixtures originally designed 
for incandescent bulbs, and product availability. 
The first factor affecting the CCE is the possibility that some CFLs may not last as long 
as claimed. We reduced the expected lifetime of CFLs from 8,000 hours to 6,000 hours 
and recalculated the costs and benefits. The next three factors represent transaction costs 
and implicit costs. For these three factors – product information cost, vendor information 
cost, and consumer preferences – we added $10, $5, and $5 respectively to the “price” of 
the bulb. The consumer preference factor represents the fact that many consumers may 
simply prefer the familiar shape of incandescent bulbs as well as the warmer light they 
emanate, and for this we also added $5 to the cost of the bulb. 
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Figure ES-1. Supply Curve of Savings Potential from CFLs Adjusted for Impact of 
Factors 
Unlike conventional conserved energy supply curves, which are composed of multiple 
measures whose quantities are unresponsive to price, this curve depicts one measure for 
which the expected savings (and CCE) increase as individual factors come into play. 
Given the costs and benefits of CFLs, the substantial implicit information cost must be 
added in order to drive market share down to current actual levels. Figure ES-1 shows 
that even with implicit costs taken into account, CFLs purchased in 2005 could cost-
effectively reduce over 16,000 metric tons of CO2 over their lifetimes. 
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The next technology chosen was resource efficient clothes washers. Most of the energy 
savings from efficient washers is due to avoided energy use from reduction of hot water 
consumption. Several factors beyond those affecting CFLs limit penetration of resource 
efficient washers. First, since washers will generally last 10 to 15 years and will not be 
replaced before their useful life is over. Thus, only a fraction of the stock is turning over 
during any given year. Second, many households do not have washer and dryer hook-ups. 
Third, major appliances are often provided in many rental units that do have washer and 
dryer hook-ups. 
The inclusion of non-energy benefits has a crucial impact on the cost-effectiveness of 
resource efficient washers. The initial weighted average CCE for all households when 
water savings are not counted is $0.136, compared to $0.049 when they are included.  
Resource efficient washers are significantly more cost-effective for those using electric-
heated water due to the higher cost per unit of energy for electricity. For example, 
although the initial CCEs for washers using gas and electric-heated water in high-income 
households are virtually the same ($0.016 and $0.017 respectively), the benefit-cost ratios 
differ significantly due to the reduced benefit of saving a cheaper fuel (1.4 versus 2.5).  
The demand for residential washers in 2005 was estimated at 817,977 units, the sum of 
replacements for retired washers (717,661) and washers for new housing stock (100,316). 
In addition to dividing the households based on type of water heating, households were 
also separated by income. This is due to differences in the costs of water and power 
among income groups, the differing shares of residency in units with washer/dryer hook-
ups, and the fact that some lower income households may not be able to secure credit for 
the resource efficient washer.   
Figure ES-2 depicts the results of our analysis. This figure includes two curves, one 
showing the estimated CCE and savings potential when water savings benefits are 
included and the other where they are not. The curve that includes water benefits shows 
that even accounting for baseline savings, over 700 thousand metric tons of CO2 can be 
avoided cost-effectively. After the baseline share is taken into account, the estimated 
impact of split incentives has a large effect on the savings potential. Moving to the right 
of the curve, our estimates of various information costs are shown to have a large impact 
on the CCE and, therefore, on the adoption of the resource efficient washers. 
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Figure ES-2. Supply Curve of Savings Potential from Resource Efficient Washers 
Adjusted for Impact of Market Factors 
For all measures, high implicit information costs were required to reduce adoption of the 
measures we examined to near current levels. While some factors such as split incentives, 
product availability, and lock-in may reduce adoption significantly, it is difficult to 
explain the rest of the gap between cost-effective potential and current penetration rates. 
Cognitive limitations on gathering and processing information may account for much of 
this gap. This suggests that government interventions to reduce information and 
transaction costs can significantly increase diffusion of resource efficient products. The 
use of minimum performance standards offers a powerful policy remedy to overcoming 
virtually all of the barriers that we have enumerated. Unlike information collection and 
dissemination programs, standards also provide a means of resolving the split-incentive 
barrier. Rigorous washing machine standards are set to take effect in California beginning 
in 2007, becoming stricter in 2010. These standards will significantly improve water and 
energy efficiency for washers sold in California. Based on our rough analysis, this 
standard should be cost-effective for most classes of consumers in California. These 
estimates are very sensitive to two factors: the initial cost of the resource efficient 
washers and the number of loads the machines are used for each week. If the cost of a 
base model resource efficient washer drops just 10% below the price used in our 
example, they would be cost-effective for all customers.1 Resource efficient washers may 
also not be cost-effective in some cases for smaller households that use their machines 
fewer than eight times per week. However, the application of standards requires careful 
analysis, and in some cases low-income households may need financial assistance to 
comply. 
                                                 
1 Due to economies of scale and technological progress, the price of many energy efficient appliances has 
often fallen after the application of minimum performance standards (Dale et al., 2002). 
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1. Introduction 
Two general approaches have been used for the assessment of energy demand and supply – 
the so-called “bottom-up” and “top-down” approaches. The bottom-up approach focuses on 
individual technologies for delivering energy services, such as household durable goods and 
industrial process technologies. For such technologies, the approach attempts to estimate the 
costs and benefits associated with investments in increased energy efficiency, often in the 
context of reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions or other environmental impacts. 
The top-down method assumes a general equilibrium or macroeconomic perspective, wherein 
costs are defined in terms of changes in economic output, income, or GDP, typically from the 
imposition of energy or emissions taxes. The California Energy Commission for instance is 
sponsoring work on the development of a top-down model in order to estimate the economic 
impacts on California of mitigation options to address climate change. 
The fundamental difference between the two types of approaches is in the perspective taken 
by each on consumer and firm behavior and the performance of markets for energy efficiency. 
The bottom-up approach assumes that various factors (often referred to as “market barriers” in 
the energy efficiency literature) prevent consumers from taking actions that would be in their 
private self-interest, that is, would result in the provision of energy services at lower cost. 
These factors include lack of information about energy efficiency opportunities, lack of access 
to capital to finance energy efficiency investment, misplaced incentives which separate 
responsibilities for making capital investments and paying operating costs. In contrast, the 
top-down approach generally assumes that consumers and firms correctly perceive, and act in, 
their private self-interest (are utility and profit maximizers), and that unregulated markets 
serve to deliver optimal investments in energy efficiency as a function of prevailing prices. In 
this view, any market inefficiencies pertaining to energy efficiency result solely from the 
presence of environmental externalities that are not reflected in market prices.  
In general, an assessment carried out using the bottom-up approach will very likely show 
significantly lower costs for meeting a given objective – e.g., a limit on carbon emissions – 
than will one using a top-down approach. To some extent, the differences may lie in a failure 
of bottom-up studies to accurately account for all costs associated with implementing specific 
actions. Top-down methods, on the other hand, can fail to account realistically for consumer 
and producer behavior by relying too heavily on aggregate data (Krause et al., 1993). In 
addition, some top-down methods sacrifice sectoral and technology detail in return for being 
able to solve for general equilibrium resource allocations. Finally, top-down methods often 
ignore the fact that economies depart significantly from the stylized equilibria represented by 
the methods (Boero et al., 1991). Each approach, however, captures costs or details on 
technologies, consumer behavior, or impacts that the other does not. Consequently, a 
comprehensive assessment should combine elements of each approach to ensure that all 
relevant costs and impacts are accounted for.  
Earlier studies have made efforts to explain the apparent discrepancies between  energy 
efficiency opportunities and their market penetration levels (Blumstein et al., 1980), 
enumerated lists of barriers (Reddy, 1991 and Koomey, 1989), discovered and documented 
new barriers (Ruderman, 1987), established that opportunities vary by income groups 
(Koomey, 1995), noted the role of immature markets (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994a), and shown 
that equivalent products are cost effective even after accounting for hidden costs (Koomey 
and Sanstad, 1994). Recent electricity supply shortages have prompted analysts to examine 
the potential for energy efficiency in California (Rufo and Coito, 2002). The above body of 
work, however, lacks three important elements, one is the limited effort to develop a 
conceptual economic framework to explain the role of specific factors, second is the lack of 
quantification of transaction costs, and the third is the lack of quantification of the impact of 
these factors on cost components and/or penetration levels.  
The thrust of this work thus focuses on the development of an approach that (1) accounts for 
all costs of a mitigation option, including non-energy and transaction costs, and (2) allows for 
representation of the impact of each factor on a cost component and/or the penetration level of 
a mitigation option. In so doing, the approach presents costs and penetration levels in a 
marginal cost curve format that is comparable to those used in top-down models. By focusing 
on the contribution of an individual factor or opportunity and its contribution to cost elements 
and penetration level, the approach allows for the development of transparent policies and 
programs that may be targeted at selected factors. It is a basic tenet of policy making that 
policies should be narrowly tailored to the problem at hand. This is both to increase the 
effectiveness of the policy response, as well as to avoid unintended consequences (Bardach, 
2000). By disentangling the contribution of specific factors, we hope to offer an approach that 
will aid government agencies and utilities to maximize their efforts to stimulate the market for 
cost-effective energy efficient technologies.  
Both top-down and bottom-up modeling approaches have traditionally assumed that 
transactions required to achieve emissions reductions are costless, or at the very least these are 
not explicitly represented in the models. A consequence is that models may be under-
reporting the cost of achieving mitigation reductions. Transaction costs comprise a large share 
of the factors affecting diffusion of new technologies and typically include those for search, 
negotiation, insurance, government approval, monitoring and verification, etc. These are 
incurred in all types of transactions but for our purposes these may be classified into two 
categories. One category includes costs of GHG emissions trading, similar to those incurred in 
the implementation of SOx and NOx programs. GHG emissions trading is a key feature of 
global models that seek to estimate the costs of GHG emissions reductions worldwide rather 
than in a country or region. A second category includes costs incurred in administering and 
implementing programs and policies to promote energy efficiency and/or other mitigation 
options. We report briefly on the costs of the first type of activity and their significance on the 
costs of reducing emissions.  
This report is organized in several sections. The next section (Section 2) reports on earlier 
studies on the development of marginal cost curves, including the effect of factors, for 
California. It also describes the cost framework that has been developed to support the 
calculation of the cost of conserved energy (CCE) of energy-efficient devices. The approach 
used for this study modifies earlier approaches, which is described in this section. Section 3 
lists typical factors and ways these add to the transaction costs of mitigation options. Our 
analysis of two residential energy-saving technologies and the impact of the factors affecting 
their adoption is presented in Section 4. Section 5 discusses results of our study and Section 6 
presents its conclusions.  
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2. Methodology 
The energy sector comprises the major energy demand sectors (industry, residential and 
commercial, transport, and agriculture), and the energy supply sector, which consists of 
resource extraction, conversion, and delivery of energy products. GHG emissions occur at 
various points in the sector, from resource extraction to end use, and accordingly, options for 
mitigation exist at various points. 
The bottom-up approach involves the development of scenarios based on energy end uses and 
evaluation of specific technologies that can satisfy demands for energy services. One can 
compare technologies based on their relative cost to achieve a unit of GHG reduction and 
other features of interest. This approach gives equal weight to both energy supply and energy 
demand options. A variety of screening criteria, including indicators of cost-effectiveness as 
well as non-economic concerns, can be used to identify and assess promising options, which 
can then be combined to create one or more mitigation scenarios. Mitigation scenarios are 
evaluated against the backdrop of a baseline scenario, which simulates the events assumed to 
take place in the absence of mitigation efforts. Mitigation scenarios can be designed to meet 
specific emission reduction targets or to simulate the effect of specific policy interventions. 
The results of a bottom-up assessment can then be compared to a top-down analysis of the 
impacts of energy sector scenarios on the macro-economy.  
In order to make the two comparable, however, it is necessary to place the cost curves used in 
the two approaches on a comparable footing. In this paper, we will focus on energy efficiency 
options and the representation of their marginal cost curves, typically referred to as cost of 
conserved energy (CCE) curves. CCE curves were developed about two decades ago to place 
energy efficiency cost estimates at a level comparable to that for supply-side options (Meier, 
1982). A CCE curve is made up of a combination of several options and can be sector-specific 
or economy-wide. The California Energy Commission has sponsored work on the 
development of such cost curves for mitigation options in the energy and forestry sectors, as 
well as preliminary supply curves for agricultural soils and non-CO2 gases. The CCE is 
estimated for each mitigation option and plotted against its resulting energy or emissions 
savings.1 A combination of such calculations yields a curve of CCE for a suite of mitigation 
options. The CCE calculation is based on investment theory2, and the CCE is expressed as  
     
)1(−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−⋅=
ES
qICCE
 
 
))1(1( nd
dq −+−= 
                                                 
1 One criticism that has been directed at the calculation of CCEs is that they may err by aggregating across the 
entire stock, without differentiating costs and discount rates for various classes of consumers. We have tried to 
avoid this mistake in our clothes washer analysis below by disaggregating potential adopters by income. 
2 Stoft (1995) offers an alternative expression that avoids the problem of double counting due to dependence 
among measures on a curve. In this paper, we use the more traditional formula, since our purpose is to illustrate 
the effect of barriers on two measures, CFLs and clothes washers, that are independent of each other in terms of 
their impacts on energy savings. 
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Where: 
CCE = Cost of energy savings for a mitigation option, in $/kWh 
I = Capital cost ($) 
q = Capital recovery factor (yr-1) 
ES= Annual energy savings (kWh/yr) 
d = discount rate 
n = lifetime of the option (years) 
 
These savings are estimated by comparing the electricity use of an efficient and an inefficient 
end-use technology, a compact fluorescent lamp (CFL) vs. an incandescent bulb for example. 
The comparable device has to be such that it offers the same service in terms of the lumen 
output, color rendering, and robustness to quality of electricity supply. The above can 
expression can easily be converted to a cost of avoided GHGs by applying emission factors to 
the energy source affected. However, since this report focuses on consumer decision-making, 
costs are left in energy terms since these are the costs consumers actually face.  
Earlier analyses of energy efficiency options typically ignored other effects of the 
implementation of such options. These effects include changes in labor, material, and other 
resource requirements that are often monetizable, and others such as reduced pollution due to 
decreased use of electricity and other fuels that may be more difficult to quantify, and in 
particular more difficult to attribute to a mitigation measure. Adding monetizable effects that 
are attributable to an energy efficiency option can increase or decrease the cost of conserved 
energy. A recent analysis of the steel industry for the US for instance shows that costs decline 
overall with the addition of labor and material benefits, but more importantly that the ranking 
of options changes such that an option ranked as 47th on the basis of its CCE becomes the top-
ranked option when these other benefits are included (Worrell, et al. 2004).  
 
)2(−−−−−−−−−−−−−−+⋅=
ES
MqICCE 
Where  
M = Annual change in labor, material and other costs, and monetizable benefits ($/yr) 
 
In our illustrative analysis of two mitigation options, the clothes washers’ option is 
particularly sensitive to the inclusion of water savings, and hence we use the expression in 
Equation 2 for calculating the CCE.  
The CCE may be compared with the price of electricity to a consumer who owns or operates 
the device. If the CCE is lower than the electricity price the end-use device is considered to be 
cost effective.  
The CCE may be estimated from different perspectives – residential consumer, utility 
company, and societal are those often used in analysis of the costs and benefits of energy 
efficiency policies and programs. An analysis from the consumer perspective focuses on the 
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cost and savings as experienced by the consumer. Capital cost (I) in this case would include 
the typical incremental retail price difference between an efficient device and its more 
standard counterpart, including any additional taxes that a consumer would incur. The energy 
savings would be those that could be estimated on the basis of rated energy consumption. The 
discount rate would be equivalent to the rate at which the consumer would borrow funds for 
the purchase of the end-use appliance. The cost of borrowing (discount rate) may vary by the 
source of credit available to a consumer, which may be represented by income as a proxy 
variable. Where access to credit is in an issue, the rate may also vary by a consumer’s 
location; urban vs. rural for instance. The CCE would be compared with the electricity tariff 
paid by the consumer.  
From a societal perspective, the CCE estimation would be similar, except that no taxes would 
be added to the capital cost and the discount rate would be typically lower and based on the 
society’s cost of borrowing funds; the tax-free rate on long-term bonds may be used as a 
proxy for this purpose. In place of the electricity tariff, the CCE would be compared with 
either the short- or long-run cost of avoided electricity supply, depending on whether the end-
use or a combination of end-uses is too small to fall within the margin of error in estimation 
of future capacity needs, or large enough to result in monitorable avoidance of new generation 
and T&D capacity. 
The use of the above methodology requires estimation of the key input variables to the 
calculation of the CCE. These include capital cost, annual electricity savings, and other 
monetizable impacts, discount rate, and the lifetime of the device. In addition, in order to 
estimate total electricity savings from such devices, one needs to estimate the number of such 
devices that would penetrate the market over a defined time frame. The estimation or the use 
of assumed values, where data are lacking, which is typically the case, has been a source of 
controversy in the CCE calculation over many years (Golove and Eto, 1996). A typical supply 
schedule begins with zero cost that rises to denote an increase in marginal cost of supplying 
an increasingly scarce commodity. Analysts have often estimated the CCE of certain 
measures to begin with negative cost values that also rise with increasing energy savings. The 
negative cost implies that the end-use device should have penetrated the market in comparison 
to an energy inefficient device regardless of the price of electricity. Empirical observations 
clearly indicate however that such is not the case. This has led to the notion that “barriers” 
prevent the penetration of energy efficient devices that have either negative cost or cost less 
than the price of electricity supply.  
3. Factors, Potentials and Transaction Costs 
Earlier reports have enumerated lists of several factors (barriers) affecting the penetration of 
energy efficient devices by customer class or tariff category, region and/or sector (Reddy, 
1991; Koomey and Brown, 1994; Golove and Eto, 1996; Eto, Prahl, and Schlegel, 1997; 
Sathaye and Bouille et al., 2001). These include lack of information, lack of access to capital, 
misplaced incentives, flaws in market structure, performance uncertainties, decisions 
influenced by custom and habits, inseparability of features, heterogeneity of consumers, 
hidden costs, transaction costs, bounded rationality, product unavailability, externalities, 
imperfect competition, etc. The extent of their inclusion affects both costs and the mitigation 
potential of a technology or a mix of technologies. Sathaye and Bouille (2001), following on 
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the work of Jaffe and Stavins (1994) classify factors into two categories. The first category 
refers to factors that economists may typically classify as “market failures”, the second to 
factors that are manifestations of consumer preferences, custom, cultural traits, habits, 
lifestyles, etc.  
Associated with each category is the concept of potentials for GHG mitigation (Figure 1). 
Each concept of the potential represents a hypothetical projection that might be made today 
regarding the extent of GHG mitigation. The leftmost line, labeled market potential indicates 
the amount of GHG mitigation that might be expected to occur under forecast market 
conditions, with no changes in policy or implementation of measures whose primary purpose 
is the mitigation of GHGs. At the other extreme, the technical potential describes the 
maximum amount of GHG mitigation achievable through technology diffusion. This is a 
hypothetical projection of the extent of GHG mitigation that could be achieved over time if all 
technically feasible technologies were used in all relevant applications, without regard to their 
cost or user acceptability. 
Definitionally, we can say that whatever physical, cultural, institutional, social, or human 
factors are preventing us from reaching the technical potential are barriers to the mitigation of 
GHG via technology diffusion. Since, however, our ultimate goal is to understand policy 
options for mitigation, it is useful to group these factors in a way that facilitates understanding 
the kinds of policies that would be necessary to overcome them. As we create these different 
categories of factors, we correspondingly create intermediate conceptions of the potential for 
GHG mitigation. Starting at the left, we can imagine addressing factors (often referred to as 
market failures) that relate to markets, public policies and other institutions that inhibit the 
diffusion of technologies that are (or are projected to be) cost-effective for users without 
reference to any GHG benefits they may generate. Amelioration of this class of market 
imperfections would increase GHG mitigation towards the level that is labeled as the 
economic potential. The economic potential represents the level of GHG mitigation that could 
be achieved if all technologies that are cost-effective from consumers’ point of view were 
implemented. Because economic potential is evaluated from the consumer’s point of view, we 
would evaluate cost-effectiveness using market prices and the private rate of time discounting, 
and also take into account consumers’ preferences regarding the acceptability of the 
technologies’ performance characteristics.  
Some of the market failures listed above can be broadly grouped together as cognitive factors 
affecting product diffusion. By this, we mean that there are limitations to consumers’ ability 
to gather and process information. Before any consumer can make the decision to adopt a 
technology, he or she must at a minimum be aware of its existence. Once aware, a consumer 
needs to make some effort to gather the information needed to make an informed decision 
about whether a given technology provides more benefits than it costs. In order to do this, an 
individual needs the analytic capacity to fairly accurately quantify the benefits and costs. 
Even an aware, informed, capable consumer must ultimately make the effort to assess benefits 
and costs before making the decision to adopt.  
A consumer who has made the decision to adopt needs to find a vendor for the product in 
question. Relatively new technologies are likely to be less widely available than their more 
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standard counterparts. Thus, limitations on cognitive resources are described by factors such 
as performance uncertainty, information costs, and bounded rationality.  
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Figure 1. Penetration of mitigation technologies: A conceptual framework 
 
Elimination of all of these market imperfections would not produce technology diffusion at 
the level of the technical potential. That is, even if these factors are removed, some GHG-
mitigating technologies may not be widely used simply because consumer preferences operate 
against their acceptance. These factors, which define the gap between economic potential and 
technical potential, are usefully placed in two groups separated by a socio-economic potential. 
The socio-economic potential represents the level of GHG mitigation that would be achieved 
if all technologies that are cost effective on the basis of using a social, rather than a private, 
rate of discount, including externalities, with the use of appropriate prices devoid of taxes and 
subsidies, were implemented. The socio-economic potential may or may not require a change 
in consumer preferences. Finally, even if all market, institutional, social and cultural factors 
whose removal is cost-effective from a societal perspective were removed, some technologies 
might not be widely used simply because they are still too expensive. Elimination of this 
requirement would therefore take us to the level of the technical potential, the maximum 
technologically feasible extent of GHG mitigation through technology diffusion. Moving 
from right to left, the figure shows that factors increase costs and reduce the savings potential 
of a mitigation technology.  
Figure 1 presents a snapshot in time of the factors and potentials for the penetration of 
technologies. Over time, technological progress, discoveries of new resources and/or 
technologies, and cost-effective government policies and programs could eliminate some of 
the factors and hence move the potential lines (including the technical potential) to the right, 
thereby increasing the savings from a mitigation option.  
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The figure also shows that transaction costs add to the cost of the mitigation option. As a 
market matures, the decline in transaction costs caused by learning by doing and 
standardization will push the cost curve lower which will increase the market penetration of a 
technology. 
The focus of this report is on the factors affecting the realization of GHG reductions from 
energy efficiency. The price of energy plays a role in determining the energy savings 
potential, the higher the price larger the potential and vice versa. In this report, however, we 
do not focus on the price of electricity. The price or tariff line is seen to intersect the marginal 
cost curve of energy efficiency savings. Should the tariff be higher, then more of these 
savings would be cost effective than would be the case otherwise.  
4. Analysis of Factors Affecting CFLs and Clothes Washers  
As noted in the introductory section, we illustrate the use of our factors approach by 
demonstrating its application to two residential building technologies – CFLs and clothes 
washers. Given the scope of this project it was decided to limit analysis to one sector to 
reduce the number of parameters to be considered. The buildings sector was chosen in part 
since considerable analysis has been performed by Berkeley Lab as part of its end-use 
labeling and standards program. These technologies are characterized by differing levels of 
financial investment as well as differing degrees of portability. Thus, each technology is 
affected by a slightly different set of the factors enumerated in Section 3. In our analysis of 
costs and benefits, we have tried to use conservative values for our parameters so that the 
benefits of adopting the resource-efficient technologies examined will not be overstated.  
4.1 Xenergy Study on California Efficiency Potential  
Our analysis relies, in part, on a 2002 report prepared for the Energy Foundation and the 
Hewlett Foundation by Xenergy Inc. (Rufo and Coito, 2002) This report was designed to 
assess the mid-term potential of energy efficiency measures from 2002 to 2011. Measures and 
technologies were limited to those technologies that are currently commercially available. 
Thus, the potential for significant efficiency improvements from new technologies was not 
considered. Our report uses this analysis of California’s efficiency potential as a starting point 
for our measure-level estimates.  
The Xenergy study focuses on electricity savings from end uses in the residential, 
commercial, and industrial sectors. The spectrum of possible efficiency savings is divided into 
five classifications: technical, economic, maximum achievable, program, and naturally 
occurring. These categories, while similar to those described above in Section 3, make no 
distinction between economic and socioeconomic potentials.  
The Xenergy study follows the traditional CCE methodology as described in Section 2 in 
which measures are assessed to determine their levelized costs per kWh saved. For any given 
measure, the entire state stock is treated as one homogenous entity and each measure is 
estimated to have a certain savings potential at a given levelized cost. These measures are 
then stacked to form supply curves. These curves are used to estimate economic potentials 
under various future energy cost scenarios.  
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The Xenergy report models adoption of energy efficiency technologies in a three-step process. 
In the first step, the total stock of the technology is pared down to the eligible stock. This step 
is a function of three different factors: (1) the applicability factor, (2) the not complete factor, 
and (3) the feasibility factor. The first factor refers to the portion of the stock for which the 
efficiency measure is relevant. For example, in our analysis of resource efficient clothes 
washers, we had to pare down the stock of total households to those households equipped 
with washer facilities. The not complete factor describes the share of stock (or new sales) that 
does not already adopt the efficient technology in question. In other words, this is the 
remaining stock after the baseline share has already been taken into account. The feasibility 
factor reduces the stock to account for cases where the efficient technology may not 
physically be able to substitute for the standard technology. For example, due to the larger 
size of CFLs, they do not fit into all fixtures designed for incandescent bulbs. These factors 
reduce the penetration level but do not affect the engineering estimate of the cost of conserved 
energy.  
The second step reduces penetration based on the level of consumer awareness. Beginning 
with an initial level of awareness, awareness levels respond to changes in marketing 
expenditures in subsequent periods. An algorithm matches awareness to the levels of this 
expenditure. A decay function built into this algorithm accounts for the decline in awareness 
that occurs over time after a marketing campaign. 
In the third step, end users who are aware of a given efficiency option must decide whether to 
adopt. This is modeled as movement along a logistical curve that pairs adoption rate values to 
benefit-cost ratio values.3 Most of the factors described in Section 3 thus are treated implicitly 
by either the awareness or adoption functions. The last two steps make the penetration level 
sensitive to marketing efforts and the benefit cost ratio, which is influenced by utility rebate 
programs and energy prices. Thus, they are used to calculate diffusion of the efficiency 
measures under various program expenditure and energy cost scenarios.  
4.2 Methodology 
We examine the impact of factors on both the penetration level and the cost of conserved 
energy of the technology. Similar to the Rufo and Coito study, we reduce the penetration level 
based on several different factors, and then look at the impact of additional factors on the 
CCE. Figure 2 depicts in a graphic form the relationship between the conceptual potentials 
and factors used in Rufo and Coito (2002) and this study. The left end of the figure represents 
no energy savings with increasing savings moving to the right. The applicability and 
feasibility factors in effect delimit the stock considered and so precede the calculation of 
savings shown in the table. The Xenergy and Berkeley Lab definitions of the baseline or 
naturally occurring savings are similar except that the Xenergy definition excludes any utility 
or government programs, whereas we include the effect of current programs on the expected 
baseline savings. The program level of savings as defined in the Xenergy report is based on a 
series of scenarios with realistic funding levels for rebates and information campaigns. The 
                                                 
3 Given the functional form of this logistical curve, exceedingly high CCE values are necessary to bring adoption 
down to near zero. Since we reduce savings estimates by the expected baseline level of adoption as a first step, 
adoption should fall to near zero by the time the last factor is applied. This does not occur with the CCE values 
we have derived. Thus, a residual level of savings above the baseline remains unexplained in these analyses.  
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maximum achievable level is attained under the most aggressive programs possible but would 
still fall short of the idealized market potential, which assumes perfect information. The 
definitions of economic potential differ somewhat in that externalities are not accounted for in 
the Total Resource Cost test method. Therefore, the Xenergy economic potential does not 
capture quite as much savings as a societal economic definition. The technical potential is the 
same, except that the Berkeley Lab conception includes an intermediary socio-cultural level 
(as shown in Figure 1). Table 2 and Table 4 show how all of these factors are applied to each 
technology and provide an explanation for how we arrive at a quantitative estimate of the 
impact of the factor, the Rufo and Coito category that is closest to the description of a factor, 
and the policies and programs that may be used to target one or more factors.  
 
Figure 2. Correspondence of Xenergy and Berkeley Lab Savings Potentials and Factors  
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Note that since we have attempted to model consumer behavior in response to the consumer’s 
perceived costs and benefits, we have performed our CCE calculations from the consumer 
perspective. This is similar to the approach used by Rufo and Coito except that they used 
avoided energy and demand costs by time period instead of customer energy rates. We have 
also used the same logistical curve used by Rufo and Coito to model adoption in response to 
the consumer benefit-cost ratio, but we have used different slope and mid-point parameters 
when necessary to fit our data and assumptions.  
In the following subsections, we describe the application of the methodology to two 
residential technologies. For each of these analyses we stress that the values used for various 
parameters (particularly for the implicit information and preference costs) are entirely 
hypothetical.4 The focus of this study is less on quantitative results and more on the 
application of the methodological approach. A final caveat for the results described is that 
since the adoption function is non-linear, the sequence in which the cost-increasing factors are 
applied influences their relative impacts on adoption.  
4.3 Compact Fluorescent Lamps 
CFLs were first sold commercially in early 1980s. From the beginning, engineering benefit-
cost analyses indicated that CFLs pay for themselves and ultimately save money. Yet, 
                                                 
4 Rigorous estimation of these values was beyond the scope of this study. However, economists have devoted 
considerable attention to the estimation of various implicit costs and benefits for a wide range of goods and 
activities. Generally, these studies have used one of two broad approaches, revealed preferences and contingent 
valuation (use of surveys). See Boardman et al. (1996) and references therein for a review of this literature. 
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residential market share of CFLs remained below 1% in the U.S. until 2000 and had only 
climbed to less than 3% by 2003. For California, the share was only slightly higher until the 
electricity crisis in 2001 when the share jumped to about 6% for the year. Since 2001, the 
market share of CFLs has fallen to between 4% and 5% per year (Itron, 2004). Given the 
energy savings CFLs provide, their slow penetration into the residential lighting market would 
be difficult to explain. The high initial cost of CFLs served as a psychological factor affecting 
purchase and reduced the net savings due to the reduction in electricity consumption. For the 
first few years after their introduction into the market, CFLs cost anywhere from ten to as 
much as thirty times the cost of a standard light bulb. At this cost differential, consumers 
balked at the idea of paying so much for a product they were habituated to paying so little for. 
(Menanteau and Lefebvre, 2000) 
In addition, analysts have noted that CFLs were far from perfect substitutes for standard 
incandescent bulbs. The early generation of CFLs generated many complaints from 
consumers, due to four aspects of the lights themselves. With incandescent bulbs, consumers 
are used to instant illumination, but with the early CFLs there was a significant delay between 
flicking the switch and the illumination of the bulb. In addition, the cycle rate of the bulbs 
created a noticeable flicker of the light bulbs that annoyed consumers. Color rendition was 
also another facet of CFLs that impeded widespread adoption since the light was bluer and 
colder than the light from incandescent bulbs. Finally, the large size of CFLs and their ballasts 
prevented their use in many standard fixtures. (Menanteau and Lefebvre, 2000) Technological 
improvement has eliminated or mitigated most of these factors, yet market share remains very 
low.  
4.3.1 Parameter Values for Calculating the CCE 
Table 1 lists the values used to calculate the initial CCE for purchasing a CFL. The costs for 
the bulbs were taken as fairly typical costs for bulbs in grocery or hardware stores, although 
CFLs can often be found for much less than $10 in large discount stores or online. The 
wattages and lifetimes used are standard for these types of bulbs. Since the average length of 
time a fixture is used per day affects the benefits from purchasing a CFL, we based our 
analysis on an average use figure of 2.5 hours per day, the same figure used for the majority 
of residential fixtures included in the Rufo and Coito (2002) analysis. A discount rate of 15% 
was selected as a compromise between the 8% nominal rate used by Rufo and Coito (2002) 
and the higher implicit discount rates often observed in the purchase decisions of individuals.5 
The CCE was calculated by using the price differential between the CFL and the present value 
of the eight bulbs that would be needed to replace it over a span of 8.8 years (the amount of 
time an 8,000 hour bulb should last at 2.5 hours per day), a total of $2.47. The difference was 
annualized over the life of the bulb, yielding an initial CCE of $0.031 per kWh saved each 
year (Table 2, Row 1). 
                                                 
5 Rufo and Coito use 8% since it was the rate mandated by the CPUC for program filing by California’s investor-
owned utilities in 2001. (Rufo and Coito, 2002) 
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Table 1. Parameter Values for Calculating the CCE and Benefits for CFLs 
 Cost Wattage Elec Cost per 
kWh 
Lifetime 
(Hours) 
Hours of Use 
per Day 
Discount 
Rate 
Incandescent $0.50 75 $0.10 1,000 2.5 15% 
CFL $10.00 18 $0.10 8,000 2.5 15% 
 
4.3.2 Calculation of the Initial Stock 
Our estimate of total savings potential begins with the figure of 12.3 million California 
households in 2001 given in the latest Residential Energy Consumption Survey (RECS) data 
(U.S. EIA, 2003). To estimate the number of households in 2005, we increased the number of 
households by a 1.2% annual rate of growth,6 which yields nearly 12.9 million. We estimate 
that there are 13 fixtures per household in use for approximately 2.5 hours per day. This is the 
simple average of the estimated number of single-family residence (18) and multifamily 
residence (8) fixtures used at 2.5 hours per day as reported by Coito and Rufo (2003). From 
this we subtract the number of fixtures that are estimated to be using CFLs by 2005. To derive 
this estimate we calculated the cumulative number of CFLs purchased in the eight years (the 
approximate lifespan of a CFL used 2.5 hours per day) prior to 2005 using data from Itron 
(2004). Since CFL market share was less than or about equal to 1% prior to 2001, we used 1% 
as the market share from 1997 through 2000, then 6% for 2001, and 5% for subsequent years. 
The result is that by 2005, a cumulative 21% of all fixtures are assumed to be using CFLs. 
The removal of these fixtures from the eligible stock is equivalent to Rufo and Coito’s 
application of what they refer to as the “not complete” factor. The remaining number of 
fixtures, nearly 132.8 million, represents the starting point for our analysis (Table 2, Row 1). 
4.3.3 Analysis of the Impact of Factors 
Table 2 presents a list of factors used for our analysis of CFL penetration. The factors are 
listed sequentially as they were applied. Each row in the table shows for each factor, its 
incremental effect on the CCE, the cumulative CCE, the incremental and cumulative shares of 
the initial eligible stock not adopting as a result of the factor, the absolute impact on reducing 
the number of fixtures adopting and the corresponding GHG savings,7 a brief explanation of 
the factor and its value, suggested policies and programs, and the analogous factor used in the 
Rufo and Coito (2002) analysis.  
The first factor listed is not actually a barrier per se, but is rather an adjustment of eligible 
stock for the expected actual market share, which represents the base case. For the year 2005, 
we assume the trend from the previous two years remains steady at 5%, which leaves about 
130.4 million eligible fixtures to be replaced in 2005.  
                                                 
6 This based on the average rate of projected population growth in California between 2000 and 2005. (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2004)  
7 Avoided GHG emissions were calculated from reduced electricity consumption using the emission factor of 
300.7 g CO2/kWh given in California Climate Action Registry (2002).  
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The first several factors are all deemed to affect the eligible stock of fixtures without 
necessarily impacting the expected costs and benefits. For example, the fact that an assumed 
1% of households have their electric service included in their rent (i.e. are not separately 
metered) reduces the number of households considered likely to adopt CFLs since they do not 
benefit from the savings CFLs offer (Row 2). This is often the case for university dormitories 
where individual rooms are not metered. However, this has no bearing on the CCE of other 
households purchasing CFLs. The next factor, “lock-in,” refers to the fact that due to the 
larger size and mass of CFLs they do not fit into all fixtures that were originally designed for 
incandescent bulbs (Row 4). Despite the reductions in the size of the bulbs that have occurred 
in recent years, it is assumed that due to various factors, CFLs still will not fit in 20% of the 
fixtures without some modification.8 This results in a total reduction of adopters from the 
eligible stock of 29%. The final “costless” factor affecting the number of adopters is product 
availability (Row 5). For this factor we assume that approximately 20% of the population 
does not have convenient access to CFLs. This is based on an underlying assumption that 
most of the rural population, roughly 5% of the total, (U.S. EIA, 2003) and roughly 15% of 
the urban and suburban population do not have access to CFLs in the nearby stores where 
they typically shop.  
The next factor is the first one that affects the CCE. It is important to keep in mind that with 
the introduction of a factor changing the CCE of an energy efficient product another 
significant change occurs in our estimation of the number of adopters. In addition to the 
change in CCE, we begin to use the adoption algorithm to model consumer responses to 
changes in the benefit-cost ratio.  
The inclusion of the product lifetime uncertainty factor represents the possibility that a 
consumer may doubt claims about the expected lifetime of CFLs or may underestimate the 
impact that product lifetime has on offsetting the equivalent number of incandescent bulbs 
needed (Row 6). To model this factor, we reduced the expected lifetime of CFLs from 8,000 
hours to 6,000 hours and recalculated the costs and benefits. The change in lifetime raises the 
CCE by $0.007 and reduces the number of adopters by nearly 16%.  
The next three factors represent transaction costs and implicit costs. For these three factors – 
product information cost, vendor information cost, and consumer preferences – we added $10, 
$5, and $5 respectively to the “price” of the bulb (Rows 7, 8, and 9). The product information 
cost reflects two broad levels of awareness. One condition is the possibility that a consumer is 
not aware of CFLs at all. The information cost of this scenario is difficult to monetize. How 
much does it cost to make a consumer aware of something and to understand the benefits of 
buying the product? The answer may be the cost per consumer of a marketing campaign, but 
it is difficult to estimate the cost of successfully educating a consumer about the net savings 
from CFLs or other technologies whose upfront costs are higher than more standard options. 
The second possibility is that a consumer is vaguely aware of CFLs and the fact that they save 
energy but has not acquired the information necessary to accurately assess the real savings 
and other benefits they offer. This scenario is more easily quantified as the time cost of the 
                                                 
8 While it is true that CFLs have been developed to fit virtually every standard screw-in fixture, certain types 
such as dimmable and three-way lights, are not commonly available. Moreover, some smaller lamps have shades 
designed to fit directly onto standard A19 bulbs. 
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consumer looking up the information needed to make an informed choice. Our values are 
loosely based on the time a relatively aware consumer would need to spend to look up 
information on the product in question at a time cost of $20 per hour. The additional 
information cost of $10 more than doubles the CCE leading to a sharp drop in the number of 
adopters. The inclusion of the vendor information (or “search”) cost, estimated at $5, further 
reduces the adoption by another 6% of the total.  
The consumer preference factor represents the fact that many consumers may simply prefer 
the familiar shape of incandescent bulbs as well as the warmer light they emanate (Row 9). 
While current models of CFLs have improved the warmth of the light, many consumers may 
still associate fluorescent light with the bluer light given by tube fluorescents and may not be 
aware of the improvements in CFL technology. For this factor, we added another $5 to the 
“cost” of the CFL. This results in another 40% relative drop in adoption, leaving a residual 
savings of 2,209 GWh, a little less than 4% of the total estimated technical potential savings.  
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Table 2. Effect of Market Factors on CFL Sales in California in 2005 (18W CFL vs. 75W Incandescent Bulb Used 2.5 Hours 
per Day) 
Factor Parameter 
Affected 
CCE 
Effect 
Total 
CCE 
Penetration 
Reduction 
Effect 
Cumul 
Red’n 
Adopting 
Stock in 
2005 
Lifetime GHG 
Savings from 2005 
Purchases, k 
tonnes CO2
Explanation Policies & 
Programs 
Xenergy 
Variable 
1. Initial Stock N/A N/A $0.031 N/A N/A 132,770,314 18,205 These are the initial values 
before factors are applied. 
N/A N/A 
2. Baseline 
Share 
ES N/A $0.031 5% 5% 126,131,798 17,295 The estimated California 
market share of CFLs in 
2005. 
N/A Not Complete 
Factor 
3. Split 
Incentive 
ES N/A $0.031 1% 6% 124,870,481 17,122 Assumes a small number of 
HH pay a flat fee for 
electricity. 
N/A Applicability 
Factor 
4. Lock-In 
(lights do not 
fit fixture) 
ES N/A $0.031 20% 25% 99,896,384 13,698 The number of fixtures that 
do not accommodate CFLs. 
N/A Feasibility 
Factor 
5. Product 
Availability 
ES N/A $0.031 20% 40% 79,917,108 10,958 Assumes some rural 
population and some lower 
income urban population do 
not have nearby stores selling 
CFLs. 
Utility-run 
purchase by 
mail programs  
N/A 
6. Lifetime 
Uncertainty 
LT $0.007 $0.038 16% 49% 67,316,135 6,923 Lifetime reduced by two 
thousand hours to reflect 
uncertainty over product 
lifetime. 
Consumer 
education on 
CFL testing 
and reliability 
N/A 
7. Product 
Information 
Cost 
K $0.048 $0.086 72% 86% 18,970,889 1,951 Assumes one-half hour 
needed (at $20 time value per 
hour) for consumers to 
educate themselves about 
CFLs. 
Consumer 
awareness 
campaign on 
benefits of 
CFLs 
Awareness 
Function 
8. Vendor 
Information 
Cost 
K $0.024 $0.110 44% 92% 10,696,434 1,100 Assumes one quarter hour 
needed to find nearby vendors 
with CFLs. 
Product and 
vendor lists for 
consumers 
Awareness 
Function 
9. Consumer 
Preference, 
Light Quality 
& Bulb Shape 
K $0.024 $0.134 40% 95% 6,459,449 664 Assigns a $5 penalty to CFLs 
to reflect consumer preference 
for familiar incandescent light 
and shape. 
Consumer 
awareness 
about CFL 
improvements 
N/A 
Notes: HH = households; ES = eligible stock; LT = lifetime; K = capital cost 
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Figure 3. Supply Curve of Savings Potential from CFLs Adjusted for Impact of Factors 
Figure 3 depicts the CCE and GHG savings numbers from Table 2 as a conserved energy 
supply curve. Unlike conventional conserved energy supply curves, which are composed of 
multiple measures whose quantities are unresponsive to price, this curve depicts one measure 
for which the expected savings (and CCE) increase as individual factors are overcome. The 
savings potential of each factor is calculated as the incremental change from one factor to 
another as shown in Table 2, with the baseline savings being the difference between the total 
technical potential (18,205 k tonnes) and the reduced savings potential accounting for baseline 
share shown in Row 2. Each successive point on the curve pairs the incremental difference 
from row to row with corresponding CCE.  
CFLs face relatively few factors affecting eligible stock other than incompatible fixtures. The 
key factor seems to be lack of information. Given the costs and benefits of CFLs, the 
substantial implicit information cost must be added in order to drive market share down to 
current actual levels. As part of that lack of information it is also quite possible that many 
consumers are not aware of the improvements that have taken place in CFL technology in 
recent years. Thus, expanding the market share of CFLs may depend in part on overcoming 
biases against them due to prior consumers’ experiences with earlier generations of CFLs.  
Table 2 also lists the types of policies and programs that might be implemented in order to 
increase the market penetration of CFLs. Each factor is matched to an appropriate policy or 
program that effectively targets it. CFLs in the current market are clearly a cost-effective 
device to purchase. Yet, their market share is quite low.  
We exclude the discussion of standards since they simultaneously address all of the factors 
affecting adoption and thus obviate the need for factor specific analysis. Due to the impact of 
standards on the entire consumer market, standards cannot be implemented lightly. Their use 
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requires careful technical and economic analysis to ensure that benefits outweigh costs. 
Distributional effects also need to be considered so that any expenditure increases due to 
standards do not place an undue burden on lower-income consumers. CFLs, however, save 
money in virtually all applications, with the exception of very low-use fixtures.  
It is also difficult to apply standards to the CFL market since the GHG savings comes not 
from an incremental improvement in the standard technology but from the adoption of an 
altogether different technology. Short of banning the sale of incandescent bulbs, a standard 
cannot be applied to the entire stock. However, the use of buildings codes to require 
installation of CFLs for new and remodeled homes could be extended to cover more areas of 
home lighting. 
All of the major California utilities have some program in place to promote CFLs. All of the 
utilities with the exception of LADWP offer a rebate for purchasing CFLs, although LADWP 
does offer a rebate for certain fixtures hard-wired for CFLs. In addition, they offer a free six-
pack of CFLs to customers who take advantage of their refrigerator/freezer recycling 
program. The other utilities all offer instant in-store rebates through specific retailers. 
According to our analysis, however, the price of CFLs is not, per se, the principal factor to 
their increased diffusion. Even at $10 per bulb, which is much higher than either the price 
available at high-volume retailers or through on-line vendors, our analysis shows that CFLs 
reduce GHG emissions at a very low CCE. The problem primarily lies in the lack of 
information on the part of consumers, which suggests that aggressive education and marketing 
campaigns might be more effective. Addressing this lack of information can help to address 
several factors: lifetime uncertainty, information cost, vendor search costs, and consumer 
preferences.  
SMUD and SDG&E are pursuing this strategy with a more proactive approach to stimulating 
the market. SDG&E is sponsoring community information events as well as lighting exchange 
events where customers can turn in incandescent bulbs and halogen torchieres for free CFLs 
and fluorescent torchieres. (SDG&E, 2004) SMUD also has a program to target customers at 
area Wal-Marts to promote CFLs. (SMUD, 2004) Utilities may also address the problem of 
product availability by either selling CFLs directly to customers by mail or directing 
customers to phone-order and online distributors. 
How might one use this type of analysis in a bottom-up or top-down modeling framework? 
The analysis highlights that merely using engineering cost analysis is likely to yield 
technology costs that are too low and penetration levels that are too high. The explicit 
inclusion of factors as illustrated above will yield cost curves that are more realistic. The 
analysis thus permits explicit evaluation of individual factors and the extent to which these are 
likely to affect engineering cost and market penetration level estimates. A modeler would then 
have the option of deciding the policies and programs that are likely to be implemented and 
estimate their impacts on the cost curve. Alternatively, a modeler may choose to run 
alternative scenarios of policy and program intervention to evaluate their impacts. Similarly, 
transaction costs that are described in the Appendix could be explicitly added to the cost of 
carbon reduction of a technological option in a model.  
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4.4 Resource Efficient Clothes Washers 
The next technology chosen was resource efficient clothes washers. For washers, we say 
“resource efficient” rather than energy efficient since efficient clothes washers save 
significant amounts of water as well as energy. Indeed, most of the energy savings is due to 
avoided energy use from reduction of hot water consumption.  
Both the physical size of washers and the significant price premium between resource 
efficient washers and standard vertical axis washers introduce new factors to be considered 
beyond those used in the CFL analysis. First, although not a barrier per se, is the fact that 
washers will generally last 10 to 15 years and will not be replaced before their useful life is 
over. Thus, only a fraction of the stock is turning over during any given year. Second, many 
households do not have washer and dryer hook-ups. Residents in these households must use 
either on-site facilities or laundromats and thus have no control over the choice of washers 
that will be purchased. Eligible stock is thus limited to households with washer and dryer 
hook-ups. Finally, major appliances are often provided in many rental units. This arrangement 
introduces the split incentive factor, since the renters’ desire to reduce energy and water 
consumption expenditures conflicts with the property owners desire to provide the appliances 
at the lowest possible cost.  
4.4.1 Parameter Values for Calculating the CCE 
The values used to calculate the initial CCE for resource efficient clothes washers are shown 
in Table 3. The cost of standard washers is taken as a typical price for the low-end models 
offered from online retailers such as Sears or Best Buy. The cost, as well as the expected 
annual unit electricity consumption (UEC), of the resource efficient model is based on the 
Kenmore 44042 from Sears.com. For the electricity and gas UECs of clothes washers using 
gas-heated water, some assumptions had to be made. Other values were adapted either from 
those given in the Energy Star washer savings calculator or derived from calculation therein. 
(U.S. EPA, 2004) The washer savings calculator assumes that about 10% of the total 
electricity consumption of a washer using electric heated water is consumed for mechanical 
energy by the washer itself. Thus, we used the same ratio for our standard model. However, 
we assume that the ratio is not accurate for resource efficient washers since so much less 
electricity is used for water heating. We assume that the ratio is closer to 20%. The natural gas 
and water consumption values are rounded values from the Energy Star calculator.  
The price of water comes from East Bay Municipal Utility District (EBMUD). (EBMUD, 
2004) These values include the charges for wastewater treatment as well as City of Berkeley 
sewer service (City of Berkeley, 2004). The higher value for high-income households 
assumes that larger houses and additional end-uses lead to higher water consumption, which 
is charged at a higher incremental rate. For low-income households it is assumed about half of 
water is provided at the subsidized rate. Due to the differences in the cost of water, as well as 
power, it was decided to segment the market into low, middle, and high-income groups. These 
groups are defined simply as the lowest, middle two, and highest quartiles of households. 
Electricity and natural gas costs are from the 2004 values for PG&E. (PG&E, 2004a; PG&E, 
2004b) For electricity, these values assume that low-income households receive power at the 
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average of the Tier 1 and Tier 2 (baseline and 100 to 130% above baseline) CARE rates, that 
middle-income households marginal savings are taken from the standard Tier 2 rate, and that 
high-income households savings are taken from the Tier 3 (131%+ above baseline) rate due to 
larger houses and more end-uses. The values for natural gas follow similar assumptions. The 
low-income rate is the average of CARE baseline and excess rates, middle-income is the 
average of the standard and excess baseline rates, and high-income is the excess rate. All 
values for water and energy consumption are derived from an underlying assumption of 392 
loads a year as proscribed by the official DOE test procedure. (U.S. DOE, 2004) 
 
Table 3. Parameter Values for Calculating the CCE for Resource Efficient Washers 
UEC w/ 
Gas WH 
Energy Cost, Elec per 
kWh 
Energy Cost, Gas per 
Therm 
Water Cost Discount Rate  Cost UEC 
w/ 
Elec 
WH 
Elec Gas 
Annual 
Water 
Consum
ption  
LI MI HI LI MI HI LI MI HI LI MI HI 
Standard 
Washer 
$400 600 60 36 14,000 $0.10 $0.14 $0.18 $.742 $.952 $1.062 $.0056 $.0067 $.0072 20% 15% 10% 
Resource 
efficient 
Washer 
$680 218 40 18 7,000 $0.10 $0.14 $0.18 $.742 $.952 $1.062 $.0056 $.0067 $.0072 20% 15% 10% 
 
The use of washers as one of the end-use options we have examined also offers an example 
where the inclusion of non-energy benefits has a crucial impact on the cost-effectiveness of 
the technology. Although the cost of tap water per gallon is trivial, the fact that washers are 
responsible for such a large quantity of residential consumption means that for households 
with gas water heating, the annual monetary savings from avoided water consumption 
outweigh those from reduced energy consumption. The initial weighted average CCE for all 
households when water savings are not counted is $0.136, compared to $0.049 when they are 
included. 
4.4.2 Calculation of the Initial Stock 
The calculation of the eligible stock of washers sold in 2005 starts with U.S. shipment data 
from the Association of Home Appliance Manufacturers’ Fact Book 2000. (AHAM, 2000) 
Since we take 12 years as the average lifetime of a home washer, we looked at domestic 
shipments for 1993 as an estimate of the number of washers that will need to be replaced in 
2005. We then multiplied this figure by the California share of U.S. population (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2002) to estimate the number of washers sold in California in 1993. This results in an 
estimate of 717,661 washer retirements in 2005. For the number of new washers sold in 2005, 
we used population estimates from the Census for 2005 and calculated the average annual rate 
of growth from 2000 to 2005 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2004). This rate was used to estimate the 
additional households that would be needed to house the population growth from 2004 to 
2005. This figure is 146,892. Multiplying this by the percentage of households with washers 
from RECS 2001 – approximately 68% (U.S. EIA, 2003), leaves 100,316 washers sold for 
new housing units.  
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In addition to the differences in the costs of water and power among income groups, another 
reason for segmenting the market is that higher income households are assumed to have a 
higher share of residency in units with washer/dryer hook-ups, either in single family 
residences (SFRs) or larger, more modern multifamily residences (MFRs). Thus, the share of 
low-income households assumed to have in-house laundry facilities was reduced by 30%, and 
the share of high-income households was increased by 30%. Middle-income households were 
assumed to have in-house laundry facilities at the average rate.  
Since heating water by natural gas costs less than heating water electrically, the type of water 
heater has a large impact on the monetary savings due to resource efficient washers. Thus, 
total washer sales also split into two different categories according to whether the water heater 
used in the household is natural gas or electric. Since a split of water heater types by income 
was not available, the statewide figure of 85% was used for all income groups. (U.S. EIA, 
2003) Resource efficient washers are significantly more cost-effective for those using electric-
heated water due to the higher cost per unit of energy for electricity. For example, although 
the initial CCEs for washers using gas and electric-heated water in high-income households 
are virtually the same ($0.016 and $0.017 respectively), the benefit-cost ratios differ 
significantly due to the reduced benefit of saving a cheaper fuel (1.4 versus 2.5). Due to the 
predominance of gas water heating in California residences (U.S. EIA, 2003), the total CCE 
and penetration results are determined mostly by the calculations for gas water heating. 
4.4.3 Analysis of the Impact of Factors 
Table 4 lists all factors affecting washers, their impacts on CCE and reduction of adoption, as 
well as policies that might be appropriate for each factor. The CCE and penetration effects 
have been aggregated from the water heater and income categories in order to simplify the 
presentation of results and to show the total impact on the entire population. In general, 
resource efficient clothes washers are more cost-effective for higher-income households due 
to the higher imputed costs for water and power as well as the lower discount rates.  
The total amount of lifetime CO2 emissions that would be avoided if all washers purchased in 
California in 2005 were comparable to the resource efficient model we examine rather than 
standard models would be 1,012 thousand metric tons CO2 (Table 4, Row 1).10 We assume 
that the share of resource efficient washers among new sales in 2005 will not have changed 
much from the most recent figure we found, which is 12% for 2001. (CEE, 2002) Accounting 
for this baseline share leaves 887 thousand metric tons CO2 that can potentially be achieved 
by various policies and programs (Row 2). The initial CCE is only $0.041, an extremely cost-
effective CCE on average.11 However, this average CCE hides significant differences among 
the income groups. While the middle-income group is close to the average, the CCE for high-
                                                 
10 Avoided CO2 emissions were calculated using an emission factor of 300.7 g CO2/kWh and 52.78 g 
CO2/thousand Btu for natural gas. (California Climate Action Registry, 2002) 
11 Note that in order for figures to be given in comparable units, the heat content of the natural gas used for water 
heating was converted to kWh using a conversion factor of 3,412 Btu per kWh. However, more final energy is 
required to heat water with natural gas due to the waste heat lost in combustion gases and other factors. 
Therefore, the values for natural gas were reduced to their useful energy content using a factor of 0.62 (based on 
gas water heater efficiency standards in place from 1991 to 2004) in order to make the CCE values less 
dependent on fuel choice. (U.S. GPO, 2001) 
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income households is much lower at $0.018. Low-income households have a much higher 
CCE of $0.076 due to the lower energy and water prices they pay, as well as their higher 
discount rate.  
Both the split incentive and product availability factors substantially reduce the number of 
households that will buy resource efficient washers (Rows 3 and 4). To assign values to these 
factors we had to make several assumptions. The split incentive factor assumes that most 
rental households with washers have the washers provided by the property owner. We also 
assume that the higher the income the less an impact split incentives will have due to a larger 
share of residents in SFRs. The product availability factor is similar to that used for CFLs 
with an assumption that resource efficient washers are somewhat less widely available than 
CFLs. The capital access factor was modeled in a very simplified manner since this factor 
would be extremely difficult to quantify more precisely. We have simply assumed that for 
every $100 of additional cost between a resource efficient washer and a standard model, a 
certain percent of the population will not be able to obtain financing for it. This percentage 
varies among the income groups: 10% for low-income households and 5% for middle-income 
households. High-income households are assumed not to face capital constraints.  
The subsequent factors are analogous to those described for CFLs. Either the performance is 
decreased below expected values to reflect lower consumer confidence in unfamiliar products 
(Rows 6 and 7), or various implicit costs are added to the sale price of the machine (Rows 8 
through 10). For performance uncertainty, energy consumption was increased by 15%. This 
results in an increase in the weighted average CCE of 17% and a reduction in the adopting 
stock of 14%. For lifetime uncertainty, three years were shaved off the expected lifetime of 
the resource efficient washer. This increases the CCE by over 46% and reduces adoption by 
28%. Significant implicit costs had to be added to the machines in order to reduce adoption to 
near actual levels. For lower-income households we assigned a $60 product information cost, 
and for middle- and high-income households we used $50. The addition of the information 
cost reduced total adoption by another 10%. For transaction costs and consumer preferences, 
we used $40 for all consumers. Together, these two barriers reduced adoption by another 8%, 
leaving 89 thousand metric tons CO2 of unexplained residual savings. This is about 9% of the 
estimated savings from adoption by the total initial stock. Consumer preferences for standard 
washers may be due in part to the greater number of models on the market offering a wide 
range of features as well as to the familiarity consumers have with standard top-loader 
washers. Of the factors subject to policy solutions, the policy prescriptions offered suggest 
that the biggest obstacles to increasing consumer acceptance of resource efficient washers are 
information factors of various sorts. 
However, one of the larger factors, which is obscured by the aggregation of results in Table 4, 
is simply the cost-effectiveness of resource efficient washers. For the low-income group using 
gas water heating, resource efficient washers do not pay for themselves. In other words, the 
benefit-cost ratio is less than one. Likewise, for the middle-income group using gas water 
heating, the initial benefit-cost ratio is only slightly greater than one. This is due to the fact 
that the price of gas per unit of final energy is much lower than electricity, equaling a little 
over $0.03 for a kilowatt-hour’s worth of heat. These households would probably require a 
rebate in addition to information to begin buying resource efficient washers in significant 
numbers.  
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In addition to the analysis of the factor impacts on CCE and rate of adoption, Table 4 also lists 
the policies or programs that we believe are well suited to overcoming each factor. Most of 
the recommended programs are consumer awareness and education campaigns. Rebates, 
however, may be effective in attracting consumers to resource efficient washers who are not 
necessarily capital-constrained. Reducing the cost difference between the two types of 
washers would also serve to lessen consumer concerns over whether the benefits of owning 
resource efficient washers compensate for the price premium paid.  
As for CFLs, we do not list minimum performance standards, which depending on their 
stringency, have the potential to achieve virtually all of the estimated potential savings shown 
in Table 4. Rigorous washing machine standards are set to take effect in California beginning 
in 2007, becoming stricter in 2010. These standards will significantly improve water and 
energy efficiency for washers sold in California. Based on our rough analysis, this standard 
should be cost-effective for most classes of consumers in California. For low-income 
households using gas water heating, resource efficient washers may not pay for themselves, 
assuming that these households receive reduced rates for their water and power. These 
estimates are very sensitive to two factors: the initial cost of the resource efficient washers 
and the number of loads the machines are used for each week. If the cost of a base model 
resource efficient washer drops just 10% below the price used in our example, they would be 
cost-effective for all customers.12 Resource efficient washers may also not be cost-effective 
for some smaller households that use their machines fewer than eight times per week. Keep in 
mind, these estimates are calculated purely from the customer perspective and do not take into 
account the true opportunity cost of the water consumed. 
Several of the major California utilities have existing programs to promote the purchase of 
resource efficient clothes washers. With the exception of Southern California Edison, all of 
them offer rebates between $75 and $125 depending on the efficiency of the washer.13 
LADWP offers a top rebate of $150 of combined energy and water rebates for the purchase of 
certain washers (LADWP, 2004). SDG&E has a washer rebate, but the program has already 
distributed all of its money for 2004. Most of the utilities have fact sheets on their web sites 
that provide some information on the benefits and features of resource efficient washers. A 
few utilities also provide energy analyzers on their websites to enable users to more easily 
assess the costs and benefits of purchasing resource efficient washers.  
 
 
 
12 Due to economies of scale and technological progress, the price of many energy efficient appliances has often 
fallen after the application of minimum performance standards (Dale et al., 2002). 
13 The level of the rebate depends on whether the washer is a Tier 1 or Tier 2 and higher washer. A description of 
the tiers and their efficiency levels is available from CEE (2004). 
 
Table 4. Effect of Market Factors on Resource Efficient Washing Machine Sales in California 
Factor Parameter 
Affected 
CCE 
Effect 
Cumulative 
CCE 
Penetration 
Reduction 
Effect 
Cumul 
Red’n 
Stock 
Adopting 
in 2005 
Lifetime GHG 
Savings from 
2005 Purchases, 
k tonnes CO2
Explanation Policies & 
Programs 
Xenergy 
Variable 
1. Initial Stock N/A N/A $0.043 N/A N/A 817,977 1,012 These are the initial values before 
factors are applied. 
N/A N/A 
2. Baseline 
Share 
ES N/A $0.043 12% 12% 716,957 887 Nat’l share of RE washers among 
new sales in 2001 was 12%. Our 
allocation assumes LI HH 
unwilling to buy at current 
premium. Allocation between MI 
and HI results in 12% overall 
share.  
N/A Not Complete 
Factor 
3. Split 
Incentive 
ES N/A $0.043 23% 32% 552,359 683 # rental HH in CA is slightly less 
than 50%. Our allocation 
assumes lower shares of rental 
HH w/ higher incomes. Half of 
rental HH assumed to have either 
no in-unit W/D hook-up or to be 
already furnished w/ W/D. 
N/A Applicability 
Factor 
4. Product 
Availability 
ES N/A $0.043 24% 48% 422,555 523 Assumes rural population (10%) 
has no access to RE washers, and 
15% of sub/urban population has 
no easy access. 
N/A N/A 
5. Access to 
Capital 
ES N/A $0.043 12% 54% 372,510 461 Calculated as 10% of LI HH 
cannot obtain financing for every 
$100 premium for RE washers 
and 5% for MI HH.  
Rebates or 
low-interest 
loans for 
qualifying 
HH. 
N/A 
6. Energy 
Consumption 
Uncertainty  
S $0.007 $0.051 14% 61% 321,591 427 Machine’s rated consumption 
increased 15% to reflect 
possibility that machine does not 
perform as well as under test 
conditions. This decreases 
savings and thus adds to CCE. 
Consumer 
education on 
optimal 
washer 
settings. 
N/A 
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Factor Parameter 
Affected 
CCE 
Effect 
Cumulative 
CCE 
Penetration 
Reduction 
Effect 
Cumul 
Red’n 
Stock 
Adopting 
in 2005 
Lifetime GHG 
Savings from 
2005 Purchases, 
k tonnes CO2
Explanation Policies & 
Programs 
Xenergy 
Variable 
7. Lifetime 
Uncertainty 
LT $0.023 $0.074 28% 72% 231,209 340 Lifetime reduced by three years 
to reflect uncertainty over 
product lifetime. 
Consumer 
education on 
washer 
testing and 
durability. 
N/A 
8. Product 
Information 
Cost 
K $0.034 $0.110 35% 82% 149,999 184 Add $50 information cost for MI 
and HI consumers to educate 
themselves about RE washers 
and $60 for LI consumers (due to 
lower percentage with internet 
access). 
Consumer 
awareness 
campaign on 
benefits of 
RE washers. 
Awareness 
Function 
9. Vendor 
Information 
Cost 
K $0.026 $0.137 26% 86% 110,907 120 Adds $40 of time/hassle cost to 
find nearby vendors with RE 
washers. 
Product and 
vendor lists 
for 
consumers. 
Awareness 
Function 
10. Consumer 
Preference, 
Features 
K $0.026 $0.165 24% 90% 84,044 89 Assigns a $40 penalty to RE 
washers to reflect lower variety 
of models and features that 
consumers may desire. 
Consumer 
awareness on 
range of RE 
models. 
N/A 
Notes: HH = households; LI = low income; MI = middle income; HI = high income; ES = eligible stock; LT = lifetime; S = (cost) savings; K = capital cost; RE = 
resource efficient 
Figure 4 depicts the results shown in Table 4 above as a conserved energy supply curve. We 
have also added the curve we calculated for the case where the water savings are not taken 
into account. These curves demonstrate the importance of water savings in making resource 
efficient washers an attractive investment for the average residential user. Note that the 
potentials for each measure do not line up on the X axis since the relative impacts of the 
measures on the benefit-cost ratios differ in the two cases. The curves also help to illustrate 
that a large share of the potential savings is affected by factors that have little or no impact on 
the CCE. According to our rough estimates, over 70% of the post-baseline savings are 
impeded by the first four factors, after which the CCE is still below $0.05.  
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Figure 4. Supply Curve of Savings Potential from Resource Efficient Washers Adjusted 
for Impact of Market Factors 
 
5. Discussion 
The previous analyses illustrate how a factor-specific approach can be applied to estimates of 
the costs and savings potentials of various end-use technologies. This approach offers an 
alternative to the traditional method of constructing CES curves where each measure is given 
one CCE based on engineering estimates and one savings potential based on the application of 
the measure to the eligible stock. The power of a more disaggregated approach is that savings 
potentials may be estimated more accurately by accounting for the implicit costs and other 
factors that impede adoption of new technologies. By making the treatment of each factor 
explicit, a more realistic sense of the trade-offs involved between savings and the costs of 
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overcoming the factors affecting savings can be incorporated into economic models that 
attempt to account for the effect of energy efficiency policies.  
While we have attempted to sketch out the basic approach, there are some obstacles that limit 
our analysis. To some extent there are methodological questions for which no definitive 
answers exist. For example, what is the “right” private discount rate? To what extent does the 
private discount rate vary by income? There are also questions regarding the definition of 
information costs and how they should be estimated. Information costs may be defined as the 
cost of the effort for a consumer to educate himself about the features, costs, and benefits of a 
given technology. The cost of programs to provide information to consumers about an energy 
efficient technology is an alternative approach to estimating information costs. However 
information costs are defined, they are difficult to quantify, as are the impacts of consumer 
preferences for various aspects of end-use technologies. We have determined these values 
using informed judgment of time spent in seeking information and its opportunity cost.  
With further research, it should be possible to more accurately estimate the impacts of 
individual factors on various measures. Additionally, if consumer responsiveness to policies 
and programs targeting these factors can be more accurately measured, policies could be more 
realistically modeled using disaggregated parameters for modeling climate mitigation policy. 
6. Conclusions 
We have seen that many factors may impede the diffusion of resource efficient technologies 
that are otherwise cost-effective. Some of these factors affect the adoption of technologies 
without changing their costs or benefits, while others carry hidden or implicit costs. In the 
customary methods of constructing conserved energy supply curves, individual measures are 
modeled as providing a certain amount of savings at a fixed CCE. However, the amount of 
savings one can expect from a measure is not completely independent of cost. Although we 
have not explicitly attempted to model consumer response to policies and programs, the 
analysis of supply curves presented in this report could be incorporated into economic models 
to make the treatment of policies and programs more explicit and, hopefully, more precise.  
For all measures, high implicit information costs were required to reduce adoption of the 
measures we examined to near current levels. While some factors such as split incentives, 
product availability, and lock-in may reduce adoption significantly, it is difficult to explain 
the rest of the gap between cost-effective potential and current penetration rates. Cognitive 
limitations on gathering and processing information may account for much of this gap. This 
suggests that government interventions to reduce information and transaction costs can 
significantly increase diffusion of resource efficient products.  
A recent statistical analysis of DSM programs at over 300 utilities finds that DSM programs 
have not been as successful at reducing customer energy demand as widely reported 
(Loughran and Kulick, 2004). The authors conclude that DSM expenditures, the majority of 
which have been spent on financial incentives, could be better spent on collecting and 
disseminating information, particularly if targeted toward customers on the edge of investing 
in energy efficient equipment. Consumer preferences for non-energy attributes of standard 
options, such as light quality for lamps or washing options for washers, might also account for 
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some of the efficiency gap, but recent improvements in CFLs and the greater number of 
resource efficient models of washers have eliminated many of the differences between 
standard and resource efficient options. 
The use of minimum performance standards offers a powerful policy remedy to overcoming 
virtually all of the barriers that we have enumerated. Unlike information collection and 
dissemination programs, standards also provide a means of resolving the split-incentive 
barrier. However, the application of standards requires careful analysis, and in some cases 
low-income households may need financial assistance to comply.  
Our analysis of the two measures examined shows the potential for large lifetime GHG 
savings from resource efficient products purchased in 2005. Since a large share of the stock of 
incandescent bulbs turns over every year due to their short lifetimes, CFLs offer by far the 
largest opportunity for lifetime savings from 2005 sales. Our figures show that after taking the 
baseline portion of sales into account, if all the incandescent bulbs burning approximately 2.5 
hours per day were replaced in 2005, lifetime savings above baseline would be 17,295 k 
tonnes CO2 at a CCE of $0.031 per kWh saved. Clothes washers sold in 2005 could save 
roughly 887 k tonnes CO2 at a CCE of $0.043, but they are affected by a significant split 
incentive barrier that may characterize over 20% of the potential stock. This measure 
demonstrates the importance of including non-energy benefits when calculating the CCE. 
When water savings are not taken into account, the CCE climbs to $0.136. It is important to 
keep in mind that even though the CCE for installing resource efficient washers in homes with 
gas water heating is similar to that for electric water heating, the greater cost per unit of useful 
electricity makes the benefit-cost ratio for consumers with electric water heating much higher.  
More research will be required to fully develop the application of this approach for use in 
economic models. As other analysts have had to for previous analyses, we have had to make 
informed estimates for many of the monetary values attached to specific factors. Further 
efforts will be needed to quantify the various types of implicit costs and to understand how to 
integrate them into economic models.  
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7. Appendix: Transaction costs 
In this section, we provide an in-depth discussion of transaction costs, which constitute an 
important subset of diffusion factors. Broadly, transaction costs can encompass several of the 
factors described above related to the cost of acquiring, assessing, and using information 
(Golove and Eto, 1996). Here we are using “transaction costs” in a narrower sense – the costs 
related to participation in an emissions trading or energy efficiency program requiring 
certification of savings.  
Transaction costs arise in the trading of emissions in a market for GHG emissions, and in the 
implementation of policies and programs for energy efficiency. In this report, we review the 
transaction costs of emissions trading in emerging carbon markets. The first cut at 
understanding the scope of the carbon market distinguishes between 1) trade in emission 
allowances which exist by virtue of a domestic or limited territorial cap on emissions and 2) 
project-based trades where buyers and sellers collaborate to create a project to reduce 
emissions. Within each system, buyers and sellers may participate on a voluntary basis either 
with or without the intention of compliance with future targets on emissions reductions. 
Certain project-based initiatives aim to encourage GHG reductions, like the Global 
Environmental Facility (GEF) as a general environmental goal, or to experiment with the 
Kyoto compliance infrastructure (e.g. AIJ) but do not result in bankable or tradable credits.  
7.1 Allowance emissions trading 
A number of allowance markets operating under a cap and trade scheme are emerging. The 
International Emissions Trading Association (IETA) website provides a complete list of 
allowance markets and extensive information on the emissions trading in general.  
There are three sources of transaction costs in allowance emissions trading. First, costs are 
incurred in establishing the scheme; second, brokers who facilitate trades incur costs; and 
third, preparation and monitoring costs are incurred by entities that participate in the scheme. 
The first type of cost may be incurred by a government department such as in the case of the 
UK trading scheme described below or by a private entrepreneur in the case of the Chicago 
Climate Exchange. The second type of cost is incurred by brokers and may be estimated from 
the fess charged by brokers and any additional cost for trading on an exchange. For instance, 
for the UK Emissions Trading Scheme (UK ETS) the UK National Audit Office reports that 
brokers have charged a rather low fee of 2% per transaction  (National Audit Office, 2004). 
The UK ETS  scheme has reported prices of emissions allowances that varied from a peak of 
$22.5 to $4.5 per tonne of carbon dioxide or $82.5 to $16.5 per t Ceq. A 2% fee would 
amount to a charge of $ 0.33 – 1.65 per t Ceq. for brokerage services alone. For the Chicago 
Climate Exchange, there is a one time initiation fee and an annual dues structure and a cost to 
register the baseline with National Association of Security Dealers (NASD) and have the 
emissions reduction verified by Det Norske Veritas (DNV). Table 5 shows the key features of 
selected trading and project based schemes, including past, existing and planned. 
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Table 5. Selected emissions trading and project based schemes 
Country/company Start Date Participants Mandatory/ 
Voluntary 
Allowance 
or Project 
based 
Coverage Project 
registration 
status 
Current or past       
UK Emissions 
Trading Scheme 
2002 All entities, except electricity 
generators   
Voluntary Allowance All six Kyoto 
GHGs 
 
Denmark  2001, 
closed 2003 
Eight electricity companies Mandatory Allowance CO2 only  
Chicago Climate 
Exchange 
Oct. 2003 14 companies and 
organizations at launch; 
includes offset projects 
Voluntary Allowance 
and project 
All six Kyoto 
GHGs 
 
BP Internal company 
CO2 trading 
1998-2000 
trial period; 
closed 2002 
All business units, each had 
individual allowance 
Voluntary/
Mandatory 
for 
individual 
units 
Allowance CO2 and CH4, 
excluding 
emissions 
from 
purchased 
power and 
heat 
 
Shell Tradable 
Emissions Permits 
System 
2000, 
closed 2002 
Six business units, based in 
Australia, Canada, Europe, 
and the US 
Voluntary Allowance CO2 and CH4  
Hesse –Tender 
(Germany) 
2003 Six companies Voluntary Project CO2  
Canadian Domestic 
Emissions Trading  
 Member companies in 
Partnerships for Climate 
Action 
Voluntary Allowance CO2 Partnerships 
for Climate 
Action 
Dutch ERUPT and 
CERUPT Programs 
2000 Renewable energy (solar, 
wind, hydro etc), Fuel switch 
(replacement of CO2-intensive 
fuels by fuels generating less 
pollution, Energy efficiency, 
Waste processing, 
Afforestation/reforestation  
Voluntary Project All six Kyoto 
GHGs 
JI and CDM 
World Bank PCF and 
Bio-carbon Fund 
1999 As above Voluntary Project All six Kyoto 
GHGs 
JI and CDM 
Global Environment 
Facility 
1991 All signatories to the 
UNFCCC 
NA NA No GHG 
trading but 
accounts for 
GHG 
reductions 
 
Activities 
Implemented Jointly 
(AIJ) 
1995 All signatories to the 
UNFCCC 
Voluntary Project No GHG 
trading but 
accounts for 
GHG 
reductions 
UNFCCC 
Climate Trust 1997 Unrestricted Voluntary Project CO2  
Proposed       
European Union 2005 Industry, electricity 
generators, and combustors > 
20 MW size 
Mandatory Allowance 
and project 
CO2  
Japan 2005 Not known Voluntary  Not known  
Norway 2005 Selected industrial processes Mandatory  CO2  
Australia, New South 
Wales 
2003 Electricity generators and 
retailers 
Mandatory Allowance C O2  
Source: Based on information derived from the UK National Audit Office (2004), various websites and general market 
information studies. 
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7.2 Project-based emissions trading 
Project-based emissions trading entails several steps that begin with project identification; 
validation of the baseline and of the additionality of its emissions reductions; implementation 
of the project; monitoring, evaluation and verification of the reductions; and certification and 
eventual registration of reductions with an entity that would grant the credits commensurate 
with the reductions. In addition to the buyers (investors) and sellers (project developers) of 
emissions reductions, there are several key players and institutions that are engaged in this 
process. The services of third party monitors, verifiers, and certifiers are sought in cases 
where independent evaluations are required or the project participants lack the skills required 
to perform these tasks. If credits are to be granted, the governmental, nongovernmental or 
private administrative agency under which credits are bought and sold has a key role to play 
in setting the standards and rules for the trade. If the credits are to be traded across countries, 
states, or other administrative and legal boundaries, two or more governments may be 
involved in approving the transaction. In the current emerging market, emissions trading is 
not always the norm, and GHG reductions may occur with the intent to gain experience with 
implementation of the steps, other than certification, that are outlined above.  
The project-based emissions trading for pre-Kyoto compliance by far is the largest CO2 
market (Lecocq and Capoor, 2003). The Kyoto Protocol provides the main impetus behind 
project-based trades, which in addition to domestic and international emissions trading under 
cap and trade schemes is another option for reducing greenhouse gas emissions that count 
towards an emissions target. Project-based mechanisms under Kyoto include the projects 
dubbed Joint Implementation, meaning that one country listed in Annex B of the Kyoto 
Protocol, mainly a list of developed countries, can establish a project to reduce emissions in 
another Annex B country, as specified in Article 6 of the KP. Efforts to bring JI projects on 
line have been encouraged by the Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) project run by the 
UNFCCC as a pilot phase for JI projects. JI  includes projects such as the Dutch Certified 
Emissions Reduction Unit Purchasing Tender (CERUPT) and Emissions Reduction Unit 
Purchasing Tender (ERUPT) programs that invest heavily in the Baltic states of Estonia, 
Lithuania and Latvia.  
The second project-based mechanism under KP is the CDM as specified in Article 12 of the 
Kyoto Protocol. The key difference between CDM and JI is the identity of the partners and 
the additional requirement of sustainable development. CDM projects occur between entities 
in an Annex B (developed) country and a developing country. Thus CDM can serve as a 
vehicle to foster technology transfer and additional investment through a climate change 
project in a developing country. The additional requirement of incorporating a “sustainable 
development” component to the project makes the procedures for CDM approval more 
stringent. The CDM system envisions the creation of several institutional elements involved 
in the trade of Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs). First are the operational entities that 
can become qualified under the CDM office to certify emission reductions. Second is the 
designated National Authority or country office in a developing, non-Annex B country to 
process CDM projects in that country. Third is the executive board which supervises CDM. In 
addition, CDM projects are required to fund adaptation projects. Streamlining the functioning 
of these institutions by designing standardized rules and procedures will facilitate transactions 
and thereby reduce transaction costs.  
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In addition, in countries which have not agreed to participate in the KP such as the United 
States, private companies and other entities may invest in projects either to meet national or 
state emissions requirements or position themselves for the future international marketplace. 
As a result a number of companies have entered the market as brokers. These include Cantor 
Fitzgerald, Trexler and Associates, and Econergy.  
The sources of transaction costs in project-based trading include the costs of setting up an 
entity to administer the trade, the buyers’ and sellers’ cost of due financial and environmental 
diligence, and the administrative cost borne by the host country government and the registry. 
The first type of administrative costs is borne by an entity such as Senter International for the 
Dutch projects or the PCF for the World Bank projects. These are borne by the Dutch 
government and the PCF contributors respectively. The buyers’ and sellers’ cost of due 
diligence include the cost of validation, monitoring, and verification and these will vary 
depending on the procedures established by the investor government and/or the CDM. In 
addition, there may be costs associated with seeking approval for the project and registering 
its GHG emissions reductions. The PCF has reported its costs for preparing a project-specific 
baseline study and determining environmental additionality to be $20,000 per project. 
 
Table 6. Transaction costs reported in selected studies 
Report Data 
Source 
# 
Observations 
Transaction 
Cost Categories 
Project Type Transaction Cost 
Estimates 
Fichtner et al. 
(2003) 
AIJ 64 Technical 
assistance, 
follow-up, 
administration, 
reporting 
32 Energy efficiency 27 
renewable energy  
3 forestry  
1 afforestation 
1 agriculture 
$.05-261/t CO2
Michaelowa et al. 
(2003) 
Ecosec
urities 
2 Not available Gas plant 
Biomass plant 
$0.65-$1.53/t CO2* 
$0.87-$2.40/t CO2* 
Michaelowa et al. 
(2003) 
AIJ 51 Technical 
assistance, 
follow-up, 
administration, 
reporting 
RE, EE, Mix $0.16 – 
$15.5/tCO2* 
Michaelowa et al. 
(2003) 
PCF 4 Negotiation, 
approval, BL, 
monitoring, 
verification, 
validation 
Agriculture, Electricity $.02- $.09/t CO2* 
*Assume an exchange rate of 8 Swedish krona per US dollar 
 
Table 6 shows a comparison of transaction costs of climate change projects reported by some 
recent studies. Both Michaelowa et al. (2003) and Fichtner et al. (2003) find a scale 
economies phenomenon, meaning that transaction costs decrease with increases in tC 
delivered. Neither study considers total production and transaction costs in calculating the 
average cost of production as output increases, so that it is uncertain if economies of scale 
hold when all costs are included. Fichtner also found that renewables had greater transaction 
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costs as a percentage of total project costs than energy efficiency projects. Michaelowa et al. 
(2003) surveyed a number of studies and sources of data. They echo the points made earlier 
that transaction cost analysis in the case of the emerging international carbon emissions 
reduction market should consider who bears transaction costs, when those costs accrue, risk 
consideration and institutional setting. Because of the apparent economies of scale effect on 
transaction cost, they suggest a threshold amount of minimum size of projects, below which 
projects are not viable unless special rules or subsidies are made available. 
Even this brief description of the carbon market reveals a complex network of players and 
institutions operating under a nascent market environment. Different regulatory frameworks 
with varying requirements exist for current or eventual trade and hence are used for different 
purposes. As a consequence, the actual product traded, the carbon emissions reduction, is not 
a homogenous product and may not be tradeable across regulatory regimes. These differences 
in turn affect the price at which the product is traded. It is important to note these differences 
to identify what is being transacted and the extent to which transactions can be compared. 
Because of the different rules governing each regulatory regime, the emissions reductions are 
not necessarily transferable from one regulatory regime to another. Therefore, while the GHG 
reduction efforts are motivated by international recognition of climate change, there are a 
number of regional, local, national and international markets rather than one continuous 
market. 
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